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Abstract. 
Outbreaks of Ebola and Marburg virus diseases have recently increased in frequency in Uganda. This 
increase is probably caused by a combination of improved surveillance and laboratory capacity, 
increased contact between humans and the natural reservoir of the viruses, and fluctuations in viral load 
and prevalence in this reservoir. The roles of these proposed explanations must be investigated to guide 
appropriate responses to the changing epidemiological profile. Other African settings in which multiple 
filoviral outbreaks have occurred could also benefit from such information. 
INTRODUCTION 
Marburgvirus and Ebolavirus, the two genera of the Filoviridae family of virus, 
cause human diseases known as Marburg virus disease (Marburg) and Ebola virus 
disease (Ebola), respectively. They are highly lethal diseases, with case fatality ratios 
typically between 20% and 90%, depending on the virus species.
1–3
 Evidence suggests 
that cave- and forest-dwelling fruit bats of the Pteropodidae family (suborder 
Megachiroptera) are the natural reservoir of both viruses.
2–7
 
The frequency of filoviral disease outbreaks in Uganda has increased in recent 
years (Figure 1). Before 2007, there had only been one reported outbreak (of Ebola) in 
Uganda.
8,9
 Since 2007, nine filoviral disease outbreaks have occurred: six Ebola 
outbreaks and three Marburg outbreaks.
10–16
 One of these outbreaks in 2007 and 2008 
involved Bundibugyo ebolavirus, which was the first new species of filovirus to be 
described in several years, an occurrence that has been ascribed to improved 
surveillance capacity.
11,12
 
Similar patterns have been observed elsewhere: there were no reported outbreaks 
of Ebola globally between 1979 and 1994, but this time was followed by near 
simultaneous reemergence of the disease in Gabon, Cote D’Ivoire, and the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (Figure 2).
17,18
 Similarly, there were no known 
cases of Marburg globally between 1987 and 1998,
17
 whereas three outbreaks have 
occurred in Uganda since 2007. 
The reasons for the apparent increasing frequency of filoviral disease outbreaks in 
Uganda are unknown. We present the most likely explanations and suggest steps to 
further elucidate filoviral transmission dynamics and guide the healthcare response to 
the changing context. 
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POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS OF CHANGING EPIDEMIOLOGICAL PROFILE 
Changes to the surveillance system. 
Improved sensitivity of filoviral disease surveillance in Uganda might account for 
the increased number of epidemics; the detection of isolated cases or small clusters 
would previously have gone undetected. 
Awareness about filoviral diseases and their signs and symptoms is increasing 
among Ugandan health professionals, because experience grows with each subsequent 
outbreak. Investment in building surveillance capacity with the World Health 
Organization’s integrated disease surveillance and response strategy has also 
contributed. Political will and buy-in from the government of Uganda for 
strengthening surveillance combined with international assistance played a vital role 
in Uganda. International assistance included the establishment of a ready-to-use 
isolation ward by MSF in collaboration with the Ministry of Health, whereas the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention provided substantial technical and 
financial support for building capacity for the surveillance of viral hemorrhagic fevers 
in Uganda, particularly by improving capacity for laboratory diagnosis at the Uganda 
Virus Research Institute in Entebbe. 
Educating communities and their health staff could result in additional 
improvements. Epidemics of filoviral disease frequently occur in settings with local 
beliefs in witchcraft and curses,
19
 which undermine surveillance and infection control 
at the peripheral level: affected individuals often seek healthcare from traditional 
healers first rather than at Ministry of Health-supervised facilities, during which time 
they remain undetected and can infect their contacts.
20
 This process also happens 
when formal healthcare providers do not suspect filoviral disease and when patients 
resist admittance to isolation wards during outbreaks because fear and stigmatization. 
The improved sensitivity of surveillance activities raises the possibility that other 
outbreaks were not detected. Enhanced surveillance may, therefore, be providing a 
better understanding of filoviral transmission dynamics: low-level transmission, 
resulting in small, self-contained clusters among close contacts, may be more 
common than realized but are frequently missed by formal surveillance systems. 
Changes in patterns of interaction between humans and bats. 
There may be increasing interaction between humans and the natural reservoir of 
the filoviruses, perhaps through habitat encroachment or hunting activities.
21–23
 
Commercial mining activity began at Kitaka cave in Ibanda district in January of 
2007; within 9 months, four miners had contracted Marburg.
10
 A subsequent study 
reported that approximately 5% of the estimated 100,000 bats dwelling in Kitaka cave 
were infected by Marburgvirus.
4
 Two tourists visiting Uganda who developed 
Marburg disease on return to their countries both reported having visited the same 
cave inhabited by bats among which Marburgvirus circulates.
13,14,24
 
Changes in filoviral seroprevalence in the host species. 
Cyclic population changes of the natural reservoir could result in changes in 
filoviral seroprevalence and an increased frequency of zoonotic transmission events. 
The seroprevalence of both Ebolavirus and Marburgvirus in various bat species in 
Gabon and the Republic of Congo has been reported to fluctuate over time.
7
 Seasonal 
variation in Marburgvirus seroprevalence among Rousettus aegyptiacus has also been 
shown, with peaks coinciding with the two times per year birthing seasons.
24
 The 
same study found a strong temporal correlation between historical epidemics of 
Marburg among humans and these seasonal peaks. 
POSSIBLE SCENARIOS 
Three scenarios are suggested by the above explanations. 
(1) The increase in outbreak frequency is perceived and not real. This scenario would result from 
successful strengthening of the national surveillance system. We would expect to see similar increases 
in other filoviral-endemic countries in which capacity building has been or will be implemented. 
(2) The increase is real but linked to factors specific to Uganda. In this scenario, the public health 
concern is limited in geographical scope, and we would not expect to observe an increase in outbreak 
frequency outside of Uganda. 
(3) The increase is real and caused by factors that are not limited to Uganda. In this scenario, an 
increase in outbreak frequency outside of Uganda would be expected. 
The most likely of these scenarios is the first scenario, because strengthening of 
the Ugandan national surveillance system has demonstrably taken place in recent 
years. However, scenarios 2 and 3 are both plausible given the possible explanations 
described above, and therefore, they necessitate additional investigation as to their 
roles in the observed increased frequency of outbreaks of filoviral disease. 
DISCUSSION 
These scenarios imply different interpretations and would require different 
responses in those countries that experience more frequent filoviral disease outbreaks. 
However, the available evidence in support of any of these possible scenarios is 
mostly circumstantial; therefore, the roles that any, all, or none of these scenarios play 
in the increased frequency of filoviral disease outbreaks in Uganda must be 
investigated. Activities should focus on the following seven topics. 
(1) Reinforcing targeted surveillance activities, particularly around areas that have experienced 
multiple outbreaks and areas inhabited by bat colonies proven to be seropositive for filoviruses. 
Establishing in-country capacity for ongoing, sustained surveillance (with concommitant reduced 
reliance on external intervention) is essential for a variety of diseases, including filoviral disease, in the 
(rural) African context. 
(2) Establishment of additional ready to use isolation wards at hospitals near the most affected areas; 
one such ward has been established at Mbarara Hospital, which is close to Ibanda district. Such wards 
can be established and maintained with minimal investment—all that is required is a suitably sized 
building constructed of material that is easy to disinfect (e.g., concrete) and easy to isolate from the rest 
of the health facility—and a minimum of supplies (particularly personal protective equipment) to be 
kept in storage on site. 
(3) Improved in-country or regional capacity for accurate laboratory and differential diagnosis, which 
is underway in Uganda. The introduction of rapid testing for these diseases would also be a welcome, 
albeit secondary, measure. 
(4) Accelerated genotyping of circulating filovirus strains to determine the frequency of their 
introduction into the human population. 
(5) Seroprevalence surveys of filoviral infection in the general population of the most affected areas to 
estimate the prevalence of undetected disease in the at-risk population. 
(6) Additional studies to elucidate the ecology of filoviruses in bats are required. These studies include 
investigations of the mechanisms of natural infection and the processes of virus shedding to understand 
the pathways of transmission. In addition, studies of the prevalence of species-specific Ebolavirus 
antibodies among bat populations, similar to those studies done for Marburgvirus,
10,13,24
 are necessary 
to identify the most likely natural reservoirs, thereby defining the geographical scope of risk. 
(7) Ecological and serological comparisons between areas that have experienced multiple epidemics 
and areas that have experienced single epidemics, which may reveal factors in susceptibility to and 
transmission of filoviral disease. 
These activities could help healthcare providers to adapt and respond 
appropriately to the new paradigm. This information is relevant not only for Uganda 
but also, other African countries that have experienced outbreaks of filovirus disease 
during the past 45 years, particularly areas that have experienced multiple outbreaks, 
including the Western Equatoria state in South Sudan, Durba and Kampungu in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the Ogooué-Ivindo region of northeastern 
Gabon (Figure 2) (where Marburg virus has been found to be enzootic).
18,25
 Lessons 
from the Ugandan experience, whatever they may be, must be investigated, learned, 
and shared. 
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FIGURE 1. Timeline of outbreaks of filoviral disease known to have occurred in Uganda. This figure 
appears in color at www.ajtmh.org. 
FIGURE 2. Map of the known outbreaks of filovirus disease in Central and East Africa. This figure 
appears in color at www.ajtmh.org. 
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